Despite the large and growing importance of foreign direct investment (FDI), the international legal investment framework is highly fragmented. The contention put forward in this paper is that this situation is unsatisfactory because it creates transaction costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs) which range from the cost of legal advice to the cost of the uncertainty about rights and obligations. This paper points out a way to a future multilateral investment agreement by proposing answers to the following questions: (1) Which issues should be tackled on the multilateral level? (2) What are the optimal regulations for these issues from an economic perspective? , and (3) 
Introduction
Despite the large and growing importance of foreign direct investment (FDI), the international legal investment framework is highly fragmented. The number of international investment agreements has increased sharply in the last decade. More than 2,300 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and about The contention put forward in this paper is that the current legal situation is unsatisfactory for the following reason. International investment agreements (IIAs) are meant to be instruments for the promotion, protection and liberalisation of foreign investment. The basic idea is that FDI is an important source of capital and technology and consequently is considered a driver of economic growth. The current fragmentation of the legal framework creates transaction costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs) which range from the cost of legal advice to the cost of the uncertainty about rights and obligations. These transaction costs not only reduce the total amount of FDI, but also constitute an important source of distortions.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that an inscrutable and uncertain investment environment favours large firms with specialised legal departments and preferential access to governments. Thus, the current situation is a potential source of concentrations of power and rent-seeking activities with adverse consequences.
International investment is still subject to significant distortions. Specific rules included in a multilateral agreement aiming to remove, or at least to reduce, these policy distortions would increase world GDP. More liberalised markets for investment encourage competition and economic efficiency across and within markets, endorsing a broader dispersion of technology and capital. Consumers benefit from increased quality, wider choice, and lower prices on goods and services, while producers benefit from a level playing field, lower transaction costs and less uncertainty. What is more, international agreements may help to overcome powerful local constituencies and decrease the influence of local groups, which may have significant interests in protecting their often unproductive rents. A multilateral agreement would hamper rent-seeking activities, including bribery and corruption.
The aim is therefore to move from fragmentation to coherence. This raises three questions, or rather three groups of questions:
(1) Which issues should be tackled on the multilateral level?
(2) What are the optimal regulations for these issues from an economic perspective? and ; 1995; p.2) . Furthermore, the MAI treaty was almost completed when the negotiations came to an end and, thus, it provides a very useful tool to reveal which issues became generally accepted during the negotiations and which issues remain controversial. This paper will therefore take the MAI as a starting point from which to analyse the economic potential of an as yet nonexistent multilateral investment agreement and to identify the most significant potential deadlocks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we shall discuss the range of issues which should be covered in a future multilateral agreement. Second, we look at the content of the regulation concerning these issues. In the interests of brevity we shall focus on the definition of expropriation, treatment standards and dispute settlement. Finally, the main political problems faced by the MAI are discussed.
Which issues should be tackled on a multilateral level?
The range of investment issues which should be tackled within a multilateral agreement remains a controversial matter. The MAI negotiations have shown that the most contentious issues are the scope of the future agreement, and whether it should include provisions concerning performance requirements, investment incentives and taxation.
The definition of "investment" represents the first important hurdle in the negotiation of an investment agreement. Should the liberalisation and protection clauses within the agreement apply only to specific forms of investment (e.g. only FDI), or should the agreement cover all forms of capital movement? According to general economic theory, all forms of capital movement should be liberalised. The free movement of capital allows the limited resources to be invested where the returns are highest and, therefore, increases allocative efficiency.
In the case of the MAI, the delegations argued in favour of an open, assetbased definition of investment, which covers all forms of investment including contractual assets and the products of the investments.
Accordingly, an investor was defined as any natural or legal person of a contracting party, including permanent residents. Combined with the indirect ownership of the definition of investment, an investor could have been almost anyone, and it is difficult to imagine a broader definition (OECD, 1997b, p.9) . However, this exhaustive definition of the term "investment", which would have allowed the scope of the MAI to be adapted to the changing nature of international investment, faced significant resistance from a number of delegations (OECD, 1998b, p.11) .
Besides the political opposition, there was also resistance by (liberal) economists concerned about the full liberalisation of investment flows. In particular, short-term capital flows were considered to augment the risk of balance of payment problems and financial crises. Unfortunately for the proponents of the agreement, the MAI negotiations took place during the Asian crises. The financial crisis from 1997 to 1999 in south-east Asia represented "the strongest financial panic since the Great Depression" (OECD, 1999, p.5) . Kurtz (2003, p.760) wrote: "Against these dramatic changes in the global economy, the prospects for the MAI as a treaty which aimed to liberalize all forms of capital flow looked less certain." While temporary safeguard measures concerning serious balance of payments difficulties have been negotiated, medium-and long-term measures to control short-term capital flows have not been considered (Picciotto, 2000, p. 3). However, it is important to keep in mind that the exact causes of financial crises remain unknown despite extensive research, and that, as Krugman and Obstfeld (2000, p.714 ) point out, capital controls avoid a restructuring of weak regulatory systems and represent moreover a "potent source of corruption".
A second important hurdle is whether to include performance requirements and investment incentives. In an optimal world with no market distortion, the best policy practice would be no policy at all. Unfortunately, markets are not perfect and their regulation may be desirable from an economic perspective. Rodrik (1987) , for instance, found that the net welfare effects of export-performance requirements may be positive. A multilateral agreement imposing restrictions on the use of such measures could thus improve the welfare of capital-exporting countries by increasing the returns of MNEs, but would simultaneously, at least in the short run, reduce the host countries' welfare. In general, however, performance requirements tend to render the global economic efficiency suboptimal. On the national level Moran (1998) finds that most performance requirements in developing countries have actually retarded their development by increasing investment costs and because investors may be deterred from investing in the country in question. Furthermore, performance requirements imply a shift of the benefits from one group to another which causes rent-seeking and favours corruption. For example, local content requirements may well benefit input suppliers, but at the expense of final good producers which are confronted with higher prices and less choice. As stated by Daly (1997, p.799) , "tax and non-tax incentives for FDI constitute a potentially serious distortion to the international allocation of capital without necessarily increasing its global supply." While traditional analysis could find no significant influence of tax incentives on foreign investors, and competition between production sites in developed and developing countries was supposed to be almost nonexistent, contemporary empirical analysis shed another light on this issue. Mutti (2003) , for example, shows that over the past decades the responsiveness of international investors to locational incentives has grown. The MAI, however, has shown that even in the presence of a strong economic case in favour of the multilateral regulation of investment incentives, the implementation of such rules remains very difficult. To avoid a future situation in which real-politics continues to triumph over economics, the first step should only intend to establish more transparency and only at a later stage to restrict the competences of the local authorities in federal countries. Furthermore, to establish effective rules against investment incentives, not only the financial, but also fiscal, and other instruments would have to be restricted as well.
Let us now turn to the issue of taxation. While under Article I of the GATT agreement, the MFN treatment has to be applied to tariffs and border taxes and, under Article III, the National Treatment (NT) to internal taxes on goods, provisions regulating double taxation have traditionally only been introduced in bilateral agreements because of their reciprocal characteristics.
However, to apply the concept of non-discrimination to taxation systems within a multilateral framework would not have presented technical difficulties comparable to the regulation of double taxation. Rather, the problem seems to be political. In the early 1990s, even in the United States neither NT nor MFN treatment found its application in the domain of taxation. As Daly (1997, p.795) indicates, inward FDI in the United States had faced an average tax rate of 7.5 per cent, while domestic investments were taxed at only 5.8 per cent. FDI from the UK was taxed at 6.4 per cent and tax rates for Portugal reached 13.2 per cent. In a survey done by the European-American Chamber of Commerce, 42% of the European-owned firms in the United States felt themselves discriminated against, and that American firms had a better deal with regard to taxation. It is therefore not surprising that the European Commission pushed for inclusion of this issue while the United States remained "sceptical".
In May 1997, the MAI negotiations had not been accomplished according to plan and a consensus remained far out of reach. To limit the number of controversial issues, the non-discrimination rules concerning fiscal treatment disappeared from the MAI text, as "fiscal experts have identified a number of problems that would arise if the MAI were in its entirety to apply to taxation" (OECD, 1997a, p.23) . Taxation issues would have found their way into the MAI text only in a handful of cases such as the provision against creeping expropriation and the transparency clause, which ensure that investors are fully informed about the fiscal policy. This could not prevent concerns that the MAI text might be eroded by discriminatory taxation (Daly, 1997, p.798). 3. What are the optimal regulations for these issues from an economic perspective?
Probably the most important reason for concluding a multilateral investment agreement is that it offers better protection to investors. The protection of foreign investment against expropriation is a common clause in BITs and derives from the fact that foreign affiliates are subject to the host Particularities of the approach taken within the MAI are the NT principle and the MFN treatment principle. While the NT principle obliges governments to treat foreign investors "no less favourably" than domestic investors in like circumstances, the MFN treatment guarantees that a foreign investor will be granted treatment "no less favourable" than the treatment which is accorded to an investor from another contracting party. Their "relative" character does not aim to obstruct countries pursuing their own foreign investment policies, but to forbid discrimination against foreign investors. Both treatments applied to the pre-and post-establishment phase included in a multilateral agreement would have represented a large step forward on the way to liberalised markets (OECD, 1997a, p.18) . However, the combination of the top-down approach with the national treatment applied to the establishment of investment spawned myriad country-specific exceptions and showed the limited intentions of countries to liberalise investment. Moreover, no agreement could be reached to apply a "ratchet effect" to the exceptions during the MAI negotiations (OECD, 1998c, p.60).
Economic Unions, such as the EU, would have liked to liberalise faster for internal investors than for the other investors and to avoid "free riders".
While the Codes of Liberalisation allowed EU Member States to liberalise more rapidly or more widely among themselves without extending these measures to all OECD countries, the preferential treatment of Member States would have violated the MFN treatment clause. Therefore, the EU insisted on the introduction of the REIO (Regional Economic Integration Organisation) clause arguing that the advanced market access of its Members would be linked with obligations such as the acceptance of foreign diplomas and majority voting. To extend the benefits only to the nonmembers in such circumstances would have been difficult to justify (OECD, 1998b, pp. 14-15). Although regional investment agreements distort the world economy much less than regional trade agreements do, 3 some delegations thought that this proposal struck at the very objectives of the MAI (Canner, 1998, p.667 In other words, the provisions need to meet an incentive compatibility constraint. The basic idea is simple: In order to make sure that a multilateral agreement is approved, every participating party has to be convinced that their overall net payoff will be positive during the period the agreement stays in force. However, two main difficulties arise in practice. First, only the representatives of the Member Governments are official negotiating parties.
They are, however, strongly influenced by business communities, the labour unions and NGOs. To identify the extent to which each group has to be satisfied in order to achieve a consensus on the national level is a very difficult task. Furthermore, the theory of collective action (see, for instance, introduce an article 3 "right to regulate" into the MAI text was made (OECD, 1998c, p.14) . However, the article would have been largely meaningless, as it applies only to measures consistent with the MAI (Kurtz, 2003, p.772) .
The draft text of 1998 specifies that the MAI is open to all countries.
Although only a limited number of developing countries were expected to request accession to the MAI during the first decade, the benchmark-effect may have reduced the flexibility of these countries in the conclusion of bilateral and regional agreements. A bias of the MAI in favour of the developed countries due to the exclusion of the developing countries from negotiations would have influenced all developing countries either directly or indirectly. While foreign investors in developed countries are generally considered disadvantaged compared to the established local firms (pioneering: Hymer, 1976) , in the case of developing countries the reverse may be true.
As a result, "there exists a potential danger of regulatory competition between poor countries leading to a lowering of standards" (Fitzgerald et al., 1998, p.14) . Future negotiations should take the particularities of their economies into account, especially their vulnerability to pressure from powerful home States or from large MNEs. Therefore, certain minimal standards concerning environmental and health regulation ought to be introduced in a multilateral investment agreement. Since this topic became part of the negotiations only shortly before the MAI was abandoned, little is known about its political acceptance.
The limited capacities of a considerable number of developing countries to adapt to sudden changes in the world economy due to their limited regulatory institutions may be another problem. It is uncertain whether the benefits dominate when developing countries follow an unfettered path of liberalisation (Moran et al., 2005, p.375) . The recommendations for developing countries therefore tend towards an opening combined with increased national regulation. Bhagwati and Dunning argue that globalisation should not reduce the role of governments. "Rather, I consider that governments should realign the incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms over which they have control or influence so as to ensure that the wealth creating organizations within their jurisdiction can fully exploit and capture the benefits of globalization, while satisfying the localized needs and aspirations of their constituents" (Dunning, 2005, p.163) .
The second important point to consider is the negotiation environment. The MAI negotiations took place within the OECD. Since its foundation the OECD has been embedded in a tri-partite consultation structure including the member governments, the employees, and employer representatives at the global level (Tieleman, 2000, p.6) . However, this novel and progressive approach to include the BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Committee) and the TUAC in the negotiations did not fulfil its purpose. Critics were of the opinion that the MAI friendly position of the TUAC was not representative of the interests of the majority of the employees and that it would not sufficiently distribute the information within the internal networks (Lalumière and Landau, 1998, p.2) . Similarly, BIAC stated that it was difficult to gain the support of the business community for an agreement that appeared to be in constant flux, since the internal channels of BIAC allowed information to circulate only slowly within the business community. The involvement of the business sectors therefore remained very limited (Tieleman, 2000, p.10) . As a result, the opposition to the MAI by the NGOs was not sufficiently compensated by a counter effort let by the business groups and associations, which had worked hard to help to bring the Uruguay Round and NAFTA negotiations to a successful conclusion. was highlighted by the fact that they were finally invited to participate in the negotiations (Lalumière and Landau, 1998, p.4 goes even further and considers specialist groups to operate within strong professional ideologies, which may result in a further deviation of the resulting agreement from the "common interest" of a state.
It can be concluded that it was rather ironic that an agreement asking for more transparency from governments was negotiated under such conditions and that the lack of transparency simplified the task of the NGOs. Under these circumstances, it was relatively easy for the NGOs to gain public support and to exert a significant influence on the development of the negotiations. "The initial lack of attention to the public opinion, and to the views of civil society, created an air of hostility to the project that made it hard to justify on a political level" Muchlinski (2000 Muchlinski ( , p.1040 . Today, the secretary general of the OECD concedes that a "strategy on information, communication and explication" is necessary (Kobrin, 1999, p.106 ). An illustrative example for this "new" strategy is the policy framework for investment recently launched by the OECD (OECD, 2006).
Conclusion
The MAI's core principles aimed to eliminate the remaining barriers to investment within OECD countries and later the barriers in the non-OECD 
